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Abstract. In previous work, we presented a novel information-theoretic
privacy criterion for query forgery in the domain of information retrieval.
Our criterion measured privacy risk as a divergence between the user’s
and the population’s query distribution, and contemplated the entropy
of the user’s distribution as a particular case. In this work, we make a
twofold contribution. First, we thoroughly interpret and justify the pri-
vacy metric proposed in our previous work, elaborating on the intimate
connection between the celebrated method of entropy maximization and
the use of entropies and divergences as measures of privacy. Secondly,
we attempt to bridge the gap between the privacy and the information-
theoretic communities by substantially adapting some technicalities of
our original work to reach a wider audience, not intimately familiar with
information theory and the method of types.
1 Introduction
During the last two decades, the Internet has gradually become a part of
everyday life. One of the most frequent activities when users browse the
Web is submitting a query to a search engine. Search engines allow users
to retrieve information on a great variety of categories, such as hobbies,
sports, business or health. However, most of them are unaware of the
privacy risks they are exposed to [1].
As a concrete example, from November to December of 2008, 61%
of adults in the U.S. looked for online information about a particular
disease, a specific treatment, an alternative medicine, and other related
topics [2]. Such queries could disclose sensitive information and be used
to profile users about potential diseases. In the wrong hands, such private
information could be the cause of discriminatory hiring, or could seriously
damage someone’s reputation.
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The fact is that the literature of information retrieval abounds with
examples of user privacy threats. Those include the risk of user profiling
not only by an Internet search engine, but also by location-based service
(LBS) providers, or even corporate profiling by patent and stock market
database providers. In this context, query forgery, which consists in ac-
companying genuine with forged queries, appears as an approach, among
many others, to preserve user privacy to a certain extent, if one is willing
to pay the cost of traffic and processing overhead.
In our previous work [3], we presented a novel information-theoretic
privacy criterion for query forgery in the domain of information retrieval.
Our criterion measured privacy risk as a divergence between the user’s
and the population’s query distribution, and contemplated the entropy
of the user’s distribution as a particular case. In this work, we make a
twofold contribution. First, we thoroughly interpret and justify the pri-
vacy metric proposed in our previous work, elaborating on the intimate
connection between the celebrated method of entropy maximization and
the use of entropies and divergences as measures of privacy. Secondly,
we attempt to bridge the gap between the privacy and the information-
theoretic communities by substantially adapting some technicalities of
our original work to reach a wider audience, not intimately familiar with
information theory and the method of types.
Sec. 2 reviews the most relevant approaches in private information
retrieval and privacy criteria. Sec. 3 examines some fundamental concepts
related to information theory which will help to better understand the
essence of this work. Inspired by the maximum entropy method, we put
forth an information-theoretic criterion to measure the privacy of user
profiles in Sec. 4. Sec. 5 applies this criterion to the optimization of the
trade-off between privacy and redundancy for query forgery in private
information retrieval. Conclusions are drawn in Sec. 6.
2 State of the Art in Private Information Retrieval
Throughout this paper, we shall use the term private information re-
trieval (PIR) in its widest sense, meaning that we shall not restrict our-
selves to the cryptographically-based techniques normally connected to
that acronym. In other words, we shall refer to the more generic scenario
in which users send general-purpose queries to an information service
provider, say Googling “highest-grossing film science fiction?”. Next, we
shall introduce the most relevant contributions to PIR with regard to
query forgery and privacy criteria.
2.1 Private Information Retrieval
A variety of solutions have been proposed in information retrieval. Some of
them are based on a trusted third party (TTP) acting as an intermediary
between users and the information service provider [4]. Although this
approach guarantees user privacy thanks to the fact that their identity
is unknown to the service provider, in the end, user trust is just shifted
from one entity to another.
Some proposals not relying on TTPs make use of perturbation tech-
niques. In the particular case of LBS, users may perturb their location
information when querying a service provider [5]. This provides users with
a certain level of privacy in terms of location, but clearly not in terms
of query contents and activity. Further, this technique poses a trade-off
between privacy and data utility: the higher the perturbation of the lo-
cation, the higher the user’s privacy, but the lower the accuracy of the
service provider’s responses. Other TTP-free techniques rely on user col-
laboration. In [6,7], a protocol based on query permutation in a trellis of
users is proposed, which comes in handy when neither the service provider
nor other cooperating users can be completely trusted.
Alternatively, cryptographic methods for PIR enable a user to pri-
vately retrieve the contents from a database indexed by a memory ad-
dress sent by the user, making it unfeasible for the database provider to
ascertain which entries were retrieved [8,9]. Unfortunately, these methods
require the provider’s cooperation in the privacy protocol, are limited to
a certain extent to query-response functions in the form of a finite lookup
table of precomputed answers, and are burdened with a significant com-
putational overhead.
Query forgery, the focus of our discussion, stands as yet another alter-
native to the previous methods. The idea behind this technique is simply
to submit original queries along with false queries. Despite its plainness,
this approach can protect user privacy to a certain extent, at the cost of
traffic and processing overhead, but without the need to trust the infor-
mation provider or the network operator. Building upon this principle,
several PIR protocols, mainly heuristic, have been put forth. In [10, 11],
a solution is presented, aimed to preserve the privacy of a group of users
sharing an access point to the Web while surfing the Internet. The au-
thors propose the generation of fake accesses to a Web page to hinder
eavesdroppers in their efforts to profile the group. Privacy is measured
as the similarity between the actual profile of a group of users and that
observed by privacy attackers [10]. Specifically, the authors use the cosine
measure, common in information retrieval [12], to capture the similarity
between the group’s genuine distribution and the apparent one. Based
on this model, some experiments are conducted to study the impact of
the construction of user profiles on the performance [13]. In line with
this, simple, heuristic implementations in the form of add-ons for popular
browsers have recently appeared [14,15].
Query forgery is also present as a component of other privacy pro-
tocols, such as the private location-based information retrieval protocol
via user collaboration in [6, 7]. In [16], the authors propose submitting
true and false position data when querying an LBS provider, maintaining
certain temporal consistency, rather than doing so completely randomly.
In addition to legal implications, there are a number of technical con-
siderations regarding bogus traffic generation for privacy [17], as attackers
may analyze not only contents but also activity, timing, routing or any
transmission protocol parameters, jointly across several queries or even
across diverse information services. Furthermore, automated query gen-
eration is naturally bound to be frown upon by network and information
providers, thus any practical framework must take traffic overhead into
account.
2.2 Privacy Criteria
In this section we give a broad overview of privacy criteria originally
intended for statistical disclosure control (SDC), but in fact applicable to
query logs in PIR, the motivating application of our work. In database
privacy, a microdata set is defined as a database table whose records
carry information concerning individual respondents. Specifically, this set
contains key attributes, that is, attributes that, in combination, may be
linked with external information to reidentify the respondents to whom
the records in the microdata set refer. Examples include job, address,
age and gender, height and weight. In addition, the data set contains
confidential attributes with sensitive information on the respondent, such
as health, salary and religion.
A common approach in SDC is microaggregation, which consists in
clustering the data set into groups of records with similar tuples of key
attributes values, and replacing these tuples in every record within each
group by a representative group tuple. One of the most popular privacy
criteria in database anonymization is k-anonymity [18], which can be
achieved through the aforementioned microaggregation procedure. This
criterion requires that each combination of key attribute values be shared
by at least k records in the microdata set. However, the problem of
k-anonymity, and of enhancements [19–22] such as l-diversity, is their
vulnerability against skewness and similarity attacks [23]. In order to
overcome these deficiencies, yet another privacy criterion was considered
in [24]: a dataset is said to satisfy t-closeness if for each group of records
sharing a combination of key attributes, a certain measure of divergence
between the within-group distribution of confidential attributes and the
distribution of those attributes for the entire dataset does not exceed a
threshold t. An average-case version of the worst-case t-closeness crite-
rion, using the Kullback-Leibler divergence as a measure of discrepancy,
turns out to be equivalent to a mutual information, and lend itself to a
generalization of Shannon’s rate-distortion problem [25,26].
A simpler information-theoretic privacy criterion, not directly evolved
from k-anonymity, consists in measuring the degree of anonymity observ-
able by an attacker as the entropy of the probability distribution of possi-
ble senders of a given message [27,28]. A generalization and justification of
such criterion, along with its applicability to PIR, are provided in [3,29].
3 Statistical and Information-Theoretic Preliminaries
This section establishes notational aspects, and, in order to make our
presentation suited to a wider audience, recalls key information-theoretic
concepts assumed to be known in the remainder of the paper. The mea-
surable space in which a random variable (r.v.) takes on values will be
called an alphabet, which, with a mild loss of generality, we shall always
assume to be finite. We shall follow the convention of using uppercase
letters for r.v.’s, and lowercase letters for particular values they take on.
The probability mass function (PMFs) p of an r.v. X is essentially a rel-
ative histogram across the possible values determined by its alphabet.
Informally, we shall occasionally refer to the function p by its value p(x).
The expectation of an r.v. X will be written as EX, concisely denoting∑
x x p(x), where the sum is taken across all values of x in its alphabet.
We adopt the same notation for information-theoretic quantities used
in [30]. Concordantly, the symbol H will denote entropy and D relative
entropy or Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. We briefly recall those con-
cepts for the reader not intimately familiar with information theory. All
logarithms are taken to base 2. The entropy H(p) of a discrete r.v. X with
probability distribution p is a measure of its uncertainty, defined as
H(X) = −E log p(X) = −
∑
x
p(x) log p(x).
Given two probability distributions p(x) and q(x) over the same alphabet,
the KL divergence or relative entropy D(p ‖ q) is defined as
D(p ‖ q) = Ep log p(X)
q(X)
=
∑
x
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
.
The KL divergence is often referred to as relative entropy, as it may
be regarded as a generalization of entropy of a distribution, relative to
another. Conversely, entropy is a special case of KL divergence, as for a
uniform distribution u on a finite alphabet of cardinality n,
D(p ‖u) = logn−H(p). (1)
Although the KL divergence is not a distance in the mathematical
sense of the term, because it is neither symmetric nor satisfies the trian-
gle inequality, it does provide a measure of discrepancy between distribu-
tions, in the sense that D(p ‖ q) ≥ 0, with equality if, and only if, p = q.
On account of this fact, relation (1) between entropy and KL divergence
implies that H(p) 6 log n, with equality if, and only if, p = u. Simply
put, entropy maximization is a special case of divergence minimization,
attained when the distribution taken as optimization variable is identical
to the reference distribution, or as “close” as possible, should the opti-
mization problem appear accompanied with constraints on the desired
space of candidate distributions.
4 Entropy and Divergence as Measures of Privacy
In this paper we shall interpret entropy and KL divergence as privacy
criteria. For that purpose, we shall adopt the perspective of Jaynes’ cel-
ebrated rationale on entropy maximization methods [31], which builds
upon the method of types [30, §11], a powerful technique in large devia-
tion theory whose fundamental results we proceed to review.
The first part of this section will tackle an important question. Sup-
pose we are faced with a problem, formulated in terms of a model, in which
a probability distribution plays a major role. In the event this distribution
is unknown, we wish to assume a feasible candidate. What is the most
likely probability distribution? In other words, what is the “probability
of a probability” distribution? We shall see that a widespread answer to
this question relies on choosing the distribution maximizing the Shan-
non entropy, or, if a reference distribution is available, the distribution
minimizing the KL divergence with respect to it, commonly subject to
feasibility constraints determined by the specific application at hand.
Our review of the maximum entropy method is crucial because it is
unfortunately not always known in the privacy community, and because
the rest of this paper constitutes a sophisticated illustration of its appli-
cation, in the context of the protection of the privacy of user profiles. As
we shall see in the second part of this section, the key idea is to model a
user profile as a histogram of relative frequencies across categories of in-
terest, regard it as a probability distribution, apply the maximum entropy
method to measure the likelihood of a user profile either as its entropy
or as its divergence with respect to the population’s average profile, and
finally take that likelihood as a measure of anonymity.
4.1 Rationale behind the Maximum Entropy Method
A wide variety of models across diverse fields have been explained on the
basis of the intriguing principle of entropy maximization. A classical ex-
ample in physics is the Maxwell-Boltzmann probability distribution p(v)
of particle velocities V in a gas [32,33] of known temperature. It turns out
that p(v) is precisely the probability distribution maximizing the entropy,
subject to a constraint on the temperature, equivalent to a constraint on
the average kinetic energy, in turn equivalent to a constraint on EV 2.
Another well-known example, in the field of electrical engineering, of the
application of the maximum entropy method, is Burg’s spectral estima-
tion method [34]. In this method, the power spectral density of a signal
is regarded as a probability distribution of power across frequency, only
partly known. Burg suggested filling in the unknown portion of the power
spectral density by choosing that maximizing the entropy, constrained on
the partial knowledge available. More concretely, in discrete case, when
the constraints consist in a given range of the crosscorrelation function,
up to a time shift k, the solution turns out to be a kth order Gauss-
Markov process [30]. A third and more recent example, this time in the
field of natural language processing, is the use of log-linear models, which
arise as the solution to constrained maximum entropy problems [35] in
computational linguistics.
Having motivated the maximum entropy method, we are ready to
proceed to describe Jaynes’ attempt to justify, or at least interpret it,
by reviewing the method of types of large deviation theory, a beautiful
area lying at the intersection of statistics and information theory. Let
X1, . . . , Xk be a sequence of k i.i.d. drawings of an r.v. uniformly dis-
tributed in the alphabet {1, . . . , n}. Let ki be the number of times symbol
i = 1, . . . , n appears in a sequence of outcomes x1, . . . , xk, thus k =
∑
i ki.
The type t of a sequence of outcomes is the relative proportion of occur-
rences of each symbol, that is, the empirical distribution t =
(
k1
k , . . . ,
kn
k
)
,
not necessarily uniform. In other words, consider tossing an n-sided fair
dice k times, and seeing exactly ki times face i. In [31], Jaynes points out
that
H(t) = H
(
k1
k
, . . . ,
kn
k
)
' 1
k
log
k!
k1! · · · kn! for k  1.
Loosely speaking, for large k, the size of a type class, that is, the num-
ber of possible outcomes for a given type t (permutations with repeated
elements), is approximately 2kH(t) in the exponent. The fundamental ra-
tionale in [31] for selecting the type t with maximum entropy H(t) lies in
the approximate equivalence between entropy maximization and the max-
imization of the number of possible outcomes corresponding to a type. In
a way, this justifies the infamous principle of insufficient reason, accord-
ing to which, one may expect an approximately equal relative frequency
ki/k = 1/n for each symbol i, as the uniform distribution maximizes the
entropy. The principle of entropy maximization is extended to include
constraints also in [31].
Obviously, since all possible permutations count equally, the argument
only works for uniformly distributed drawings, which is somewhat circu-
lar. A more general argument [30, §11], albeit entirely analogous, departs
from a prior knowledge of an arbitrary PMF t¯, not necessarily uniform, of
such samples X1, . . . , Xk. Because the empirical distribution or type T of
an i.i.d. drawing is itself an r.v., we may define its PMF p(t) = P{T = t};
formally, the PMF of a random PMF. Using indicator r.v.’s, it is straight-
forward to confirm the intuition that ET = t¯. The general argument in
question leads to approximating the probability p(t) of a type class, a
fractional measure of its size, in terms of its relative entropy, specifically
2−kD(t ‖ t¯) in the exponent, i.e.,
D(t ‖ t¯) ' −1
k
log p(t) for k  1,
which encompasses the special case of entropy, by virtue of (1). Roughly
speaking, the likelihood of the empirical distribution t exponentially de-
creases with its KL divergence with respect to the average, reference dis-
tribution t¯.
In conclusion, the most likely PMF t is that minimizing its divergence
with respect to the reference distribution t¯. In the special case of uniform
t¯ = u, this is equivalent to maximizing the entropy, possibly subject to
constraints on t that reflect its partial knowledge or a restricted set of
feasible choices. The application of this idea to the establishment of a
privacy criterion is the object of the remainder of this work.
4.2 Measuring the Privacy of User Profiles
We are finally equipped to justify, or at least interpret, our proposal to
adopt Shannon’s entropy and KL divergence as measures of the privacy
of a user profile. Before we dive in, we must stress that the use of entropy
as a measure of privacy, in the widest sense of the term, is by no means
new. Shannon’s work in the fifties introduced the concept of equivocation
as the conditional entropy of a private message given an observed cryp-
togram [36], later used in the formulation of the problem of the wiretap
channel [37,38] as a measure of confidentiality. More recent studies [27,28]
rescue the suitable applicability of the concept of entropy as a measure
of privacy, by proposing to measure the degree of anonymity observable
by an attacker as the entropy of the probability distribution of possible
senders of a given message. More recent work has taken initial steps in
relating privacy to information-theoretic quantities [3, 24–26].
In the context of this paper, an intuitive justification in favor of en-
tropy maximization is that it boils down to making the apparent user pro-
file as uniform as possible, thereby hiding a user’s particular bias towards
certain categories of interest. But a much richer argumentation stems
from Jaynes’ rationale behind entropy maximization methods [31, 39],
more generally understood under the beautiful perspective of the method
of types and large deviation theory [30, §11], which we motivated and
reviewed in the previous subsection.
Under Jaynes’ rationale on entropy maximization methods, the en-
tropy of an apparent user profile, modeled by a relative frequency his-
togram of categorized queries, may be regarded as a measure of privacy, or
perhaps more accurately, anonymity. The leading idea is that the method
of types from information theory establishes an approximate monotonic
relationship between the likelihood of a PMF in a stochastic system and
its entropy. Loosely speaking and in our context, the higher the entropy
of a profile, the more likely it is, and the more users behave according to
it. This is of course in the absence of a probability distribution model for
the PMFs, viewed abstractly as r.v.’s themselves. Under this interpreta-
tion, entropy is a measure of anonymity, not in the sense that the user’s
identity remains unknown, but only in the sense that higher likelihood
of an apparent profile, believed by an external observer to be the ac-
tual profile, makes that profile more common, hopefully helping the user
go unnoticed, less interesting to an attacker assumed to strive to target
peculiar users.
If an aggregated histogram of the population were available as a ref-
erence profile, the extension of Jaynes’ argument to relative entropy, that
is, to the KL divergence, would also give an acceptable measure of privacy
(or anonymity). Recall from Sec. 3 that KL divergence is a measure of
discrepancy between probability distributions, which includes Shannon’s
entropy as the special case when the reference distribution is uniform.
Conceptually, a lower KL divergence hides discrepancies with respect to a
reference profile, say the population’s, and there also exists a monotonic
relationship between the likelihood of a distribution and its divergence
with respect to the reference distribution of choice, which enables us to
regard KL divergence as a measure of anonymity in a sense entirely anal-
ogous to the above mentioned. In fact, KL divergence was used recently
in our own work [3,29] as a generalization of entropy to measure privacy,
although the justification used built upon a number of technicalities, and
the connection to Jaynes’ rationale was not nearly as detailed as in this
manuscript.
5 Application of our Privacy Criterion to Query Forgery
This section applies the information-theoretic privacy criterion proposed
in Sec. 4 to query forgery in private information retrieval. More specifi-
cally, Sec. 5.1 establishes a privacy measure in accordance to our criterion,
which leads to the optimization problem shown in Sec. 5.2, representing
the compromise between privacy risk the redundancy introduced by bo-
gus queries. This section has been adapted from our recent work on query
forgery [3], to illustrate the criterion carefully detailed in this manuscript,
and to reach a wider audience than that intended in our original, densely
mathematical work.
5.1 Measuring the Privacy Gained by Forging Queries
Our mathematical model represents user queries as r.v.’s, which take on
values in a common, finite alphabet. Preliminarily, we simply model user
queries as r.v.’s in a rather small set of categories, topics or keywords,
represented by {1, . . . , n}. User profiles are modeled as the corresponding
PMFs.
Bearing in mind these considerations, we shall define p as the dis-
tribution of the population’s queries, q as the distribution of legitimate
queries of a particular user, and r as the distribution of queries forged by
that user. In addition, we shall introduce a query redundancy parameter
ρ ∈ [0, 1), which will represent the ratio of forged queries to total queries.
Concordantly, we shall define the user’s apparent query distribution as
the convex combination s = (1−ρ) q+ρ r, which will actually be the dis-
tribution the information service provider, or simply a privacy attacker,
will observe. Fig. 1 depicts the intuition that an attacker will be able to
compromise a user’s anonymity if the user’s apparent query distribution
diverges too much from the population’s.
User’s + Forged queries
Popula
tion’s 
querie
s
Information 
Provider
Fig. 1. A user accompanies original queries, submitted to an information
service provider, with forged ones, in order to go unnoticed.
Building upon the privacy criteria proposed in Sec. 4, we define the
initial privacy risk as the KL divergence between the user’s authentic
profile and the population’s distribution, that is, D(q ‖ p). Similarly, we
define the (final) privacy risk R as the KL divergence between the ap-
parent distribution and the population’s, that is,
R = D(s ‖ p) = D((1− ρ) q + ρ r ‖ p).
We have mentioned that entropy maximization was the special case of
divergence minimization when the reference distribution is uniform. In
terms of this formulation, for a population profile p = u uniform across
the n categories of interest,
D(s ‖u) = logn−H(s),
and, accordingly, we may regard H(s) as a measure of privacy gain, rather
than risk.
5.2 Optimizing Privacy Subject to a Forgery Constraint
This section presents a formulation of the compromise between privacy
and the redundant traffic due to query forgery, which arises from the
privacy measure introduced in Sec. 5.1. Taking into account the definition
of our privacy criterion, we shall suppose that the population is large
enough to neglect the impact of the choice of r on p. Accordingly, we
define the privacy-redundancy function
R(ρ) = min
r
D((1− ρ) q + ρ r ‖ p),
which poses the optimal trade-off between query privacy (risk) and redun-
dancy. The minimization variable is the PMF r representing the optimum
profile of forged queries, for a given redundancy ρ.
There are two important advantages in modeling the privacy of a
user profile as a divergence in general, or an entropy in particular, in
this and other potential applications of our privacy criterion. First, the
mathematical tractability demonstrated in [3]. Secondly, the privacy-re-
dundancy function has been defined in terms of an optimization problem,
whose objective function is convex, subject to an affine constraint. As
a consequence, this problem belongs to the extensively studied class of
convex optimization problems [40] and may be solved numerically, using
a number of extremely efficient methods, such as interior-point methods.
A dual version of this problem is that of tag suppression in the seman-
tic web [29], where entropy is used as a measure of privacy of user profiles,
and users may choose to refrain from tagging certain resources regard-
ing certain categories of interest. The privacy measure utilized may be
more clearly justified, and immediately extensible to divergences, under
the considerations described in this work.
6 Conclusion
There are a wide variety of proposals for the problem of PIR, considered
here in the broadest sense of the term. Within those approaches, query
forgery arises as a simple strategy in terms of infrastructure requirements,
as users do not need an external entity to trust. However, this strategy
poses a trade-off between privacy and the cost of traffic and processing
overhead.
In our previous work [3], we presented an information-theoretic pri-
vacy criterion for query forgery in PIR, which arose from the formulation
of the privacy-redundancy compromise. Inspired by the work in [26], the
privacy risk was measured as the KL divergence between the user’s appar-
ent query distribution, containing dummy queries, and the population’s.
Our formulation contemplated, as a special case, the maximization of the
entropy of the user’s distribution. Preliminarily, we simply model user
queries as r.v.’s in a rather small set of categories, topics or keywords,
and user profiles as the corresponding PMFs.
In this work, we make a twofold contribution. First, we thoroughly
interpret and justify the privacy metric proposed in our previous work,
elaborating on the intimate connection between the celebrated method of
entropy maximization and the use of entropies and divergences as mea-
sures of privacy. Measuring privacy enables us to optimize it, drawing
upon powerful tools of convex optimization. The entropy maximization
method is a beautiful principle amply exploited in fields such as physics,
electrical engineering and even natural language processing.
Secondly, we attempt to bridge the gap between the privacy and the
information-theoretic communities by substantially adapting some tech-
nicalities of our original work to reach a wider audience, not intimately
familiar with information theory and the method of types. As neither
information theory nor convex optimization are fully widespread in the
privacy community, we elaborate and clarify the connection with privacy
in far more detail, and hopefully in more accessible terms, than in our
original work.
Although our proposal arises from an information-theoretic quantity
and it is mathematically tractable, the adequacy of our formulation relies
on the appropriateness of the criteria optimized, which depends on several
factors, such as the particular application at hand, the query statistics
of the users, the actual network and processing overhead incurred by
introducing forged queries, the adversarial model and the mechanisms
against privacy contemplated.
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